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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

LONI NICOLE GRANGER, CASEY MICHAEL GRANGER,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAUREN KING, JAMAL WHITEHEAD,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 25-cv-00997-JHC

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. Plaintiffs allege two judges in this District have engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity and seek money damages. Dkt. # 1-1. On May 28, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause within seven days why this action should not be dismissed with prejudice due to judicial immunity. Dkt. # 5. The Court has considered and thoroughly reviewed all materials submitted by Plaintiffs, including the information submitted directly to chambers and after the Order to Show Cause deadline. *See* Dkt. ## 2, 3, 6, 9. Being fully advised, for the reasons below, the Court DISMISSES this matter with prejudice.

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ORDER - 2

A complaint filed by any party that seeks to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to screening, and a court must dismiss a complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants that are immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Every complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff does not need to provide detailed factual allegations, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Still, where the plaintiff is pro se, courts "construe the pleadings liberally and afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).

Judicial immunity is overcome only in two circumstances: (1) "a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity" and (2) "a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991).

Plaintiffs do demonstrate that either circumstance is present here. Although Plaintiffs say, "Judge Whitehead dismissed Plaintiffs' Bivens claim under judicial immunity" and "[i]udicial immunity does not apply to personal-capacity actions," these statements are contradictory. Dkt. # 9 at 7. Judge Whitehead's dismissal of a claim is a function normally performed by a judge, so it is a judicial action—not a personal action. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. In addition, Plaintiffs claim that Judge Whitehead's dismissal "included discriminatory language" that "violates the principles of judicial impartiality." Dkt. # 9 at 7–8. Even if Judge Whitehead's order includes discriminatory language, judicial immunity still exists because

judicial immunity extends to judicial actions "done maliciously[.]" *Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nevada*, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, Judge Whitehead is afforded judicial immunity for dismissing Plaintiffs' *Bivens* claim.

The only reference Plaintiffs make to Judge King is to attach two of her orders dismissing their prior complaints. Dkt. # 3. Again, dismissing a complaint is a function normally performed by a judge so it is a judicial action and Judge King is afforded judicial immunity for this decision. Plaintiffs likewise do not argue—nor is it apparent—that Judge King or Whitehead acted in the complete absence of jurisdiction, so judicial immunity is not overcome for this reason either.

Plaintiffs have every right to disagree with the rulings made by Judges King and Whitehead, and they can appeal these decisions to the Ninth Circuit. But they cannot pursue the claims in their complaint due to the doctrine of judicial immunity. Thus, the Court DISMISSES this matter with prejudice. Dkt. # 1. The Court STRIKES the pending motions in this matter as moot. Dkt. ## 1, 2, 3, 6.

Dated this 5th day of June, 2025.

John H. Chun

United States District Judge